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 I. Introduction          
On the morning of December 14, 2012, L1 began his assault on 
the Sandy Hook Elementary School.2 Wearing black fatigues and 
a military vest, L armed himself with a Bushmaster XM15-E2S, 
Remington’s version of the AR-15 assault rifle.3 Using that 
weapon, L entered the school by shooting a hole through a locked 
entrance, and then killed twenty children and six adults before 
killing himself.4 In response to this shooting and the loss of their 
loved ones, the families of the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
victims sought judicial relief from a gun manufacturer and two 
other defendants in the chain of distribution. 
When the plaintiffs’ claims failed to survive a motion to strike 
in the Connecticut Superior Court, they appealed to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court. On March 15, 2019, a 4-3 decision of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court fired its own shot across the bow 
of the often impenetrable shield of the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).5 With certain limited exceptions, 
the PLCAA shields gun manufacturers, dealers, and sellers of 
firearms and ammunition from any civil actions when a third party 
commits a crime or misuses the product.6 In Soto v. Bushmaster 
Firearms International, LLC,7 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
ruled that the PLCAA did not bar a lawsuit filed under the 
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).8 The majority’s 
opinion, in the face of a strong dissent, seemingly misunderstood 
the clear legislative intent of the statute. The decision also opened 
the courtroom door for families of the victims of the tragic Sandy 
Hook Elementary School shooting and may spawn litigation using 
a similar theory in other jurisdictions. This essay explores the 
                                                                                                     
 1. The authors have intentionally omitted the shooter’s name. 
 2. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 276 (Conn. 2019). 
 3. Id. at 275. 
 4. Id. at 276. 
 5.  Id. at 273; see also Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7901–7903 (2012). 
 6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903.  
 7. 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019). 
 8. Id. at 325; see also Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 42-110a–42-110q (2019). 
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PLCAA and concludes that the court’s activism supplants its own 
policy preferences for bipartisan legislation. 
II. The PLCAA Provides Broad Protection for Manufacturers, 
Distributors, and Retailers 
In 2005, Congress enacted the PLCAA in response to an 
increase in the number of lawsuits brought against the firearms 
industry for harm caused by the criminal use of firearms.9 Prior to 
the passage of the PLCAA, the gun industry found itself repeatedly 
defending against negligence and product liability claims.10 While 
the firearms industry often prevailed in such litigation, the 
firearms industry faced new obstacles with the passage of state 
and local laws clarifying liability.11 For example, some laws limited 
the liability of the industry and others held the industry liable, 
regardless of any defect in the product.12 Congress enacted the 
PLCAA, in part, due to its concern about “the possibility of 
imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely 
caused by others” which it viewed as “an abuse of the legal system” 
that would undermine both a constitutional right and civil 
liberty.13  
A. The General Rule 
One of the stated purposes of the PLCAA is “[t]o prohibit 
causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and 
importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade 
associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or 
unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by 
                                                                                                     
 9. Ross Sorenson, The Ninth Circuit Forecloses a Bullet Sized Hole in the 
PLCAA in Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126 (9th. Cir. 2009), 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 573, 573 
(2011). 
 10. Id. at 574. 
 11. Id. at 575. 
 12. See id. (“Virginia limited the liability of the firearms industry, while the 
District of Columbia’s statute essentially held gun manufacturers absolutely 
liable, regardless of product defect.”). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6). 
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others when the product functioned as designed and intended.”14 
The protections of this statute are not absolute. Although the 
statute prohibits commencing a “qualified civil liability action” in 
a state or federal court,15 the PLCAA has six exceptions to this 
blanket prohibition.16 The authors have limited their discussion to 
the exception principally relied upon by the plaintiffs in this case, 
the predicate exception.  
B. The Predicate Exception 
The predicate exception applies to “an action in which a 
manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a 
State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the 
product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for 
which relief is sought . . . .”17 The proper scope and interpretation 
of the predicate exception has been the subject of judicial scrutiny 
with courts often focused on how the word “applicable” should be 
                                                                                                     
 14. Id. § 7901(b)(1). 
 15. Id. § 7902(a). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5) details six exceptions to this rule. These exceptions 
include:  
(i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of 
Title 18, United States Code, or a comparable or identical State felony law, 
by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so 
convicted; (ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment 
or negligence per se; (iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a 
qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable 
to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate 
cause of the harm for which relief is sought . . . ; (iv) an action for breach 
of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the product; (v) 
an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly 
from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as 
intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the 
discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a 
criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate 
cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage; or (vi) 
an action or proceeding commenced by the Attorney General to enforce the 
provisions of chapter 44 of Title 18 . . . or chapter 53 of Title 26, United 
States Code . . . . 
Id. § 7903(5).  
 17. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).  
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understood.18 Does this requirement mean the particular statute 
violated must specifically apply to the sale or marketing of 
firearms, or does it mean that the statute has to simply be capable 
of being applied to the sale or marketing of firearms?  
III. The Connecticut Supreme Court Paves the Way for Gun 
Manufacturer Liability 
Before addressing the court’s interpretation of the predicate 
exception, this Part addresses the plaintiffs’ causes of action in 
Soto. Plaintiffs sued three defendants: the manufacturer, the 
distributor, and the retailer of the military assault style weapon 
used by the perpetrator in the Sandy Hook tragedy.19 The plaintiffs 
argued that defendants were liable based on two alternative 
claims: (1) the negligent entrustment of a military style weapon to 
civilians and (2) a CUTPA violation due to the advertising and 
marketing practices associated with this weapon.20 After deciding 
whether these claims could withstand the defendants’ motion to 
strike, the court then had to determine whether the PLCAA barred 
such claims. 
A. Causes of Action 
Negligent entrustment, which has its origins in English 
common law,21 holds those in possession of a dangerous instrument 
(such as a car or a gun) responsible for ensuring that such items 
are only entrusted to those fit to exercise possession.22 Connecticut 
courts that have applied the doctrine of negligent entrustment 
                                                                                                     
 18. Kyle Armstrong, Nigh-Impenetrable: Firearm Manufacturer Liability 
Under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in a Post-Heller World, 28 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 173, 185 (2018). 
 19. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 273 (Conn. 2019).  
 20. Id. at 274. 
 21. In Dixon v. Bell, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1816), the court found a 
defendant liable for harm caused by the accidental discharge of a firearm. In that 
case, defendant had asked a young girl to retrieve a loaded weapon for him, 
despite his knowledge that this young girl was unfit for this responsibility. See 
Soto, 202 A.3d at 280 (citing Dixon v. Bell, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1816)).  
 22. Soto, 202 A.3d at 279. 
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have generally required that “a person can be held liable for 
third-party injuries resulting from another’s use of a dangerous 
item only if the entrustment of that item was made with actual or 
constructive knowledge that misuse by the entrustee was 
foreseeable.”23 The plaintiffs in Soto did not allege that the 
defendants should have foreseen unsafe use of the particular 
purchased weapon.24 Instead, the plaintiffs proposed that the 
defendants were negligent simply by virtue of selling a military 
assault style weapon in the civilian marketplace “because the 
defendants could each foresee the firearm ending up in the hands 
of members of an incompetent class in a dangerous 
environment.”25 The Connecticut Supreme Court was unwilling to 
adopt the plaintiffs’ expansion of the negligent entrustment 
doctrine.26 
Having resolved the negligent entrustment claim, the Court 
then turned its attention to the plaintiffs’ claim for relief under the 
provisions of CUTPA. This statute, enacted in 1973 and modeled 
after the Federal Trade Commission Act, provides that “[n]o person 
shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce.”27 The Act, general in nature, applies in a variety of 
circumstances.28 To define an unfair or deceptive act, the courts in 
Connecticut generally rely on the “cigarette rule” of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.29 Under this rule, the court considers the 
following tests in a determination of unfairness or deception:  
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 280. 
 24. Id. at 282–83. 
 25. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, No. FBTCV156048103S, 2016 
WL 8115354, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).  
 26. Soto, 202 A.3d at 282. 
 27. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (2019). 
 28. About the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act, CONN. ST. DEP’T OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION, 
https://portal.ct.gov/DCP/Trade-Practices-Division/About-the-Connecticut-Unfai
r-Trade-Practices-Act-CUTPA (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 29. See Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 100 (Conn. 2013) (explaining that the 
cigarette rule as a test for unfairness against consumers was adopted by the FTC 
in 1964); see also J. Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its 
Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May 30, 2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-
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1. [w]hether the practice, without necessarily having been 
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has 
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in 
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common 
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; 2. 
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 
3. whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, 
[competitors or other business persons.]30 
Unfairness may result from breach of one of the above tests or 
some combination of a violation of all three tests.31 In Soto, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed the AR-15 in an 
“unethical, oppressive, immoral and unscrupulous manner.”32 
That marketing, according to the plaintiffs, included 
advertisements and catalogs promoting use of the AR-15 for 
offensive, military style missions.33 In their motion to strike the 
plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim, the defendants argued that “CUTPA does 
not provide protection for persons who do not have a consumer or 
commercial relationship with the alleged wrongdoer.”34 The 
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this argument and opted 
instead to broaden the reach of CUTPA by concluding that 
“[b]ecause the principal evils associated with unscrupulous and 
illegal advertising are not ones that necessarily arise from or infect 
the relationship between an advertiser and its customers, 
competitors, or business associates, we hold that a party directly 
injured by conduct resulting from such advertising can bring an 
action pursuant to CUTPA even in the absence of a business 
relationship . . . .”35 The court likewise rejected the defendants’ 
                                                                                                     
rise-fall-and-resurrection (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (outlining “the important role 
the FTC's unfairness authority can and should play in fashioning consumer 
protection policy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although 
the FTC moved away from use of this rule in 1980, the Connecticut courts 
continue to apply these alternative tests. See Robert M. Langer & Benjamin M. 
Daniels, Is It Time to Extinguish CUTPA’s “Cigarette Rule,” CONN. LAW., Apr. 
2016, at 14. 
 30. Ulbrich, 78 A.3d at 100. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Soto, 202 A.3d at 277. 
 33. Id. at 277–78. 
 34.  Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 2016 WL 8115354 at *17 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).  
 35.  Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 285 (Conn. 2019). 
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argument that damages for personal injury were not available 
under CUTPA, holding instead that “at least with respect to 
wrongful advertising claims, personal injuries alleged to have 
resulted directly from such advertisements are cognizable under 
CUTPA.”36  
B. The Connecticut Supreme Court Interprets the Predicate 
Exception 
Having determined that the plaintiffs “pleaded legally 
cognizable CUTPA claims sounding in wrongful marketing,” the 
Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether the PLCAA bars 
the plaintiffs’ claim.37 Plaintiffs could only maintain their claims if 
CUTPA fell within the PLCAA’s predicate exception. Stated 
differently, the court needed to determine whether “applicable to 
the sale or marketing of the product,”38 limits the predicate 
exception to statutes regulating the sale or marketing of firearms 
specifically or whether a statute of general applicability, such as 
CUTPA, qualifies for the exception.  
The court first set forth the principles it intended to apply in 
the construction of the PLCAA and its predicate exception.39 Those 
principles demand that the court first look to the plain meaning of 
the statute.40 Legislative history and other tools of statutory 
construction only become relevant when “the text of a statute is 
ambiguous.”41 According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, upon 
a finding of ambiguity in the statute, the court must next look to 
canons of statutory construction and, failing that, it must review 
the statute’s legislative history.42 In essence, the court intended to 
follow a specific roadmap in its statutory interpretation. Despite 
                                                                                                     
 36.  Id. at 300. 
 37.  Id.  
 38. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) 
(2012). 
 39. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 301 (Conn. 2019).  
 40.  Id. (citing CCT Commc’ns, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 172 A.3d 1228 
(Conn. 2017)). 
 41.  Id. 
 42. Id. at 312.  
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this roadmap, the court veered from its purported route several 
times on the way to its destination.  
1. Plain Meaning of the Statute 
A common starting point in statutory interpretation by both 
state and federal judges is that, “the plain meaning of the statute 
controls,” with an exception for those instances in which that 
outcome would either yield an absurd result or be at odds with 
congressional intent.43 In fact, “the Roberts Court has embraced a 
plain language approach to statutory interpretation.”44 It is not 
surprising then, that faced with the task of interpreting the 
undefined term of a federal law, in this case the meaning of 
“applicable,” the Connecticut Supreme Court began with an eye 
toward the ordinary, dictionary meaning of the statutory 
language.45 The dictionary definitions persuaded the court that 
‘‘applicable’’ meant simply ‘‘[c]apable of being applied . . . .’’46 This 
reading supported the plaintiffs’ view that a statute need not deal 
specifically with firearms to be within the predicate exception. 
Despite adopting this broad reading of “applicable,” the court noted 
that there were secondary dictionary definitions of ‘‘applicable’’ 
that might support the defendants’ narrower reading of the 
predicate exception.47 Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, for example, defines ‘‘applicable’’ as ‘‘fit, suitable, or 
right to be applied: appropriate . . . relevant . . . .’’48 The court 
acknowledged the reasonableness of both interpretations and then 
looked to the statutory framework of the PLCAA’s predicate 
                                                                                                     
 43. Steven Witsotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning 
and Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 325 (2009). 
 44. David A. Strauss, The Plain Language Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 651, 
651 (2016). 
 45. Soto, 202 A.3d at 302 (citing Maslenjak v. United States, 37 S. Ct. 1918, 
1924 (2017)). 
 46. Id. (citing Applicable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)); accord 
Applicable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).  
 47. Id. (citing Applicable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(2002)).  
 48. Applicable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). 
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exception to add color to its plain meaning review.49 Although the 
court began with an orderly approach to statutory interpretation, 
the court then seemed to combine the principles in a manner that 
moves away from a logical review of the PLCAA and its predicate 
exception. After finding the reasonableness of both statutory 
interpretations, the court’s own stated roadmap indicated that the 
court should have moved to the canons of construction and then, if 
necessary, the legislative history. Instead, the court used 
legislative history to draw conclusions with respect to the plain 
meaning of the statute. The court stated, “[i]f Congress intended 
the predicate exception to encompass laws that prohibit the 
wrongful marketing of firearms, and if no laws expressly and 
directly do so, then the only logical reading of the statute is that 
Congress had some other type of law in mind.”50 The authors 
cannot determine if the muddied approach here constitutes a 
failure of organization, a lack of discipline, or merely the ordinary 
difficulties inherent in statutory interpretation.  
2. Canons of Construction  
After finding two reasonable interpretations of the predicate 
exception, the court moved on to address the canons of 
construction. The phrase “canons of construction” encompasses a 
set of background norms and conventions used by courts when 
interpreting statutes.51 The U.S. Supreme Court recently referred 
to them as “simply rules of thumb which will sometimes help 
courts determine the meaning of legislation.”52 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also acknowledged that “judges regularly exercise broad 
discretion in deciding when the canons should apply . . . and how 
to reconcile them with other contextual resources . . . .”53 In Soto, 
the court reviewed several canons of construction. This part 
focuses on three particular canons addressed: narrow 
                                                                                                     
 49. Soto, 202 A.3d at 302. 
 50. Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
 51. James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the 
Elusive Question for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).  
 52. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996)). 
 53. Id. 
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interpretation of exceptions, ejusdem generis, and noscitur a sociis, 
and interpreting statutes in a manner that avoids absurd results.  
The defendants contended that the court must narrowly 
construe the predicate exception, like other statutory exceptions, 
in a manner that preserves the primary purpose of the PLCAA.54 
The court dismissed this argument finding that Congress did not 
enact the PLCAA in an effort to shield the firearms industry from 
liability for wrongful or illegal conduct.55 In other words, the court 
dismissed the canon based solely on the legislative history of the 
PLCAA, and, for reasons which the court did not explain, ignored 
the canon of construction requiring a narrow reading of an 
exception. 
The defendants also asserted the relevance of two related 
canons of construction: noscitur a sociis (the meaning of doubtful 
terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their 
relationship with other associated words or phrases) and ejusdem 
generis (when general words are accompanied by a specific 
enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be 
limited to persons or things similar to those specifically 
enumerated).56 Through the application of noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis the defendants argued that “broader terms, when 
used together with more narrow terms, may have a more restricted 
meaning than if they stand alone.”57 The defendants argued that 
the “specific examples of firearms laws that Congress provides in 
the predicate exception strongly suggest that it intended only those 
statutes that are specific to the firearms trade to be considered 
‘applicable to the sale or marketing of the product . . . .’”58 The 
court, finding the defendants’ argument unpersuasive, held that 
the related doctrines do not apply when the legislative history 
demands a broader reading.59 The court believed that Congress 
included these examples as a mere accommodation to certain 
                                                                                                     
 54. Soto, 202 A.3d at 317 (citing Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 
U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 330 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (defining noscitur a sociis); see also 
id. at 313 (majority opinion) (defining ejusdem generis). 
 57. Id. at 337 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id.  
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legislative dissenters and did not intend to narrow the reach of the 
predicate exception.60  
The court also addressed the defendants’ argument “that 
construing a statute of general applicability such as CUTPA to be 
a predicate statute would lead to an absurd result.”61 In Ileto v. 
Glock, Inc.,62 a public nuisance case brought by private plaintiffs, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed the meaning of the predicate 
exception.63 Judge Berzon stated that “the predicate exception 
cannot possibly encompass every statute that might be ‘capable of 
being applied’ to the sale or manufacture of firearms; if it did, the 
exception would swallow the rule, and no civil lawsuits would ever 
be subject to dismissal under . . . PLCAA.”64 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court dismissed the logic of Ileto v. Glock and the 
defendants’ argument with the following statement: “But we are 
confident that this sort of specific, narrowly framed wrongful 
marketing claim alleges precisely the sort of illegal conduct that 
Congress did not intend to immunize.”65 Therefore, the court 
concluded that its reading of the predicate exception would not 
lead to an absurd result when defendants engage in wrongful 
marketing practices. The court, relying on its view of the 
legislative history, dismissed the defendants’ argument and 
missed the true rationale for the PLCAA. 
3. Legislative History 
In its legislative history analysis, the court stated, “to the 
extent that any ambiguities remain unresolved, we consider the 
legislative history of PLCAA.”66 The court concluded, “[a]lthough 
the extensive history of the statute presents something of a mixed 
bag . . . Congress did not intend to limit the scope of the predicate 
exception to violations of firearms specific laws or to confer 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 316 (majority opinion). 
 61. Id. at 311. 
62. 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 63. Id. at 1155. 
 64. Soto, 202 A.3d at 311 (quoting Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1155 (Berzon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 65. Id. at 312 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 318.  
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immunity from all claims alleging that firearms sellers violated 
unfair trade practice laws.”67 The court relied on the following 
language in finding that Congress did not intend to shield CUTPA 
statutes with the PLCAA: 
This bill is only intended to protect law-abiding members of the 
firearms industry from nuisance suits that have no basis in 
current law, that are only intended to regulate the industry or 
harass the industry or put it out of business . . . which are [not] 
appropriate purposes for a lawsuit.68  
After quoting the above language, the majority interpreted the 
legislative history as limiting the applicability of the PLCAA to 
blameless defendants.69 The court then concluded that CUTPA 
violators do not constitute blameless defendants and should not 
fall within the statutory shield of the PLCAA.70 The court appears 
to rely on the language “law-abiding” to open the door to lawsuits 
for deceptive marketing. The more reasonable interpretation of the 
above statement interprets “law-abiding” as a general reference to 
an industry facing frivolous lawsuits. Thus, the phrase 
“law-abiding” describes the firearms industry frustrated by 
frivolous lawsuits and does not limit the reach of the predicate 
exception. 
The court’s analysis also misses compelling language in the 
legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to close the 
courtroom to exactly the type of case litigated in Soto. Senator 
Hatch’s criticism of pending actions makes this point. 
[L]awsuits, citing deceptive marketing or some other pretext, 
continue to be filed in a number of [s]tates, and they continue 
to be unsound. These lawsuits claim that sellers give the false 
impression that gun ownership enhances personal safety or 
that sellers should know that certain guns will be used illegally. 
That is pure bunk. Let’s look at the truth. The fact is that none 
of these lawsuits are aimed at the actual wrongdoer who kills 
                                                                                                     
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 318–19 (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,104 (2005) (remarks of Senator 
Max Baucus)). 
 69. See id. at 320. 
 70. See id.  
188 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 175 (2019) 
or injures another with a gun—none. Instead, the lawsuits are 
focused on legitimate, law-abiding businesses.71 
This statement leaves no doubt that Congress intended to shut 
down “deceptive marketing” lawsuits, such as CUTPA claims, 
intended to hold the firearms industry accountable for the acts of 
a “wrongdoer.”  
Senator Graham also made a statement describing the overall 
intent of the PLCAA. 
But what this bill prevents, and I think rightfully so, is 
establishing a duty along this line: That you have a 
responsibility, even if you do a lawful transaction or make a safe 
gun, for an event that you can’t control, which is the intentional 
misuse of a weapon in a criminal fashion by another person. 
That is the heart of this bill. It doesn’t relieve you of duties that 
the law imposes upon you to safely manufacture and to carefully 
sell. But we are not going to extend it to a concept where you 
are responsible, after you have done everything right, for what 
somebody else may do who bought your product and they did it 
wrong and it is their fault, not yours.72  
Senator Graham’s statement focuses on the crux of the issue, 
holding someone accountable for the illegal acts of another. The 
court also ignored a more specific statement related to the 
predicate exception that the dissent found compelling. For 
example, Senator Craig explained that the “bill does not shut the 
courthouse door,” in so far as  
plaintiffs will have the opportunity to argue that their case falls 
under the exception, such as violations of [f]ederal and [s]tate 
law . . . that you have knowingly sold a firearm to a person who 
cannot legally have it or who you have reason to believe could 
use it for a purpose other than intended. That all comes under 
the current definition of [f]ederal law.73  
The plain language used in this quotation identifies the types of 
items that should fall within the predicate exception and appears 
to indicate an intention to limit the exception to only those items.  
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 341 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,073 
(2005) (remarks of Senator Orrin Hatch)). 
 72. Id. at 342–43 (emphasis added) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,920 (2005) 
(remarks of Senator Lindsay Graham)). 




Henry Hart and Albert Sacks famously summed up the 
inconsistent interpretation of statutes by remarking that “[t]he 
hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no 
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of 
statutory interpretation.”74 The court’s difficulties in Soto reflect 
the struggles with statutory interpretation described by Hart and 
Sacks. In Soto, the court’s majority and dissent differed in the 
application of the rules of statutory interpretation and the 
meaning of the legislative history. As described above, the majority 
seemed to begin with a belief that the PLCAA only protects 
blameless defendants. The court compounded this error by 
allowing it to infect its entire statutory interpretation analysis in 
every step. This belief tainted its view of the predicate exception 
under the plain meaning rule and ruled out an application of 
ejusdem generis in the canons of construction. For the reasons 
stated above, the weight of authority clearly supported the 
defendants. This decision may have lit a path to the courthouse for 
victims’ families and gun control activists. Part IV attempts to 
predict how future plaintiffs, encouraged by the court’s ruling, may 
respond in other jurisdictions.  
IV. Factors Influencing Potential for Future Lawsuits in Other 
States 
Buoyed by the Soto decision, victims’ families and gun control 
activists may look for other jurisdictions to pursue the firearms 
industry. The existing state gun immunity laws and the elements 
of each state’s Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws 
could influence that choice. As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs’ 
UDAP claims will likely fail in states with gun immunity laws. 
These states have either prohibited lawsuits by political 
subdivisions or granted immunity from lawsuits in some way.75 In 
states without gun immunity laws, plaintiffs may take advantage 
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of UDAP laws that grant attorney’s fees, authorize punitive 
damages, allow the attorney general to pursue claims on behalf of 
consumers, and permit class actions.  
A. Gun Immunity Laws in Other States 
As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs filing claims in states with 
their own gun immunity laws must survive a PLCAA challenge 
and a state statutory challenge before receiving a hearing on the 
merits of their claims. According to the Giffords Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence, thirty-four states currently have statutes 
similar to the PLCAA or prohibit their cities or local government 
entities from filing lawsuits.76 Despite many similarities to the 
PLCAA, some of the states with gun immunity statutes deviate 
from the PLCAA with provisions that place additional obstacles in 
the path of plaintiffs and likely constitute the least favorable 
jurisdictions for lawsuits against the firearms industry. We 
describe below some of the inhospitable jurisdictions and their 
obstacles. 
Colorado, for example, provides for an award of attorney’s fees 
against plaintiffs who instigate lawsuits in violation of the 
Colorado gun immunity statute.77 In 2015, the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado awarded attorney’s fees 
to Lucky Gunner, LLC upon a finding that the plaintiffs’ claims 
could not overcome the statutory immunity granted gun 
manufacturers in Colorado and did not meet the predicate 
exception in the PLCAA.78 Florida goes even further in its efforts 
to shut down lawsuits against the firearms industry. Florida 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Gun Industry Immunity, GIFFORDS L. CTR., 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/gun-indu
stry-immunity/#state (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (listing Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia as states with statutes similar to 
PLCAA) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review). 
 77. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-504.5(3) (2018).  
 78. See Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1228 (D. Colo. 
2015). 
 191 
grants immunity to gun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers 
through a legislative finding that the manufacture, sale or 
distribution of firearms “is a lawful activity and is not 
unreasonably dangerous.”79 The statute also contains a legislative 
finding that the unlawful use of the firearms rather than their 
manufacture, distribution or sales is the proximate cause of 
injuries.80 Unsuccessful plaintiffs, on grounds of immunity, must 
reimburse the defendant for attorney’s fees, costs, compensation 
for loss of income, and other expenses.81 Georgia has closed the 
courtroom to claims that gun sales constitute an unreasonably 
dangerous activity or a nuisance per se, which effectively shuts 
down the nuisance lawsuits facing the firearms industry and may 
close the courtroom to other similar claims.82 Wyoming has not yet 
enacted an immunity statute. Instead, it has taken a different 
route to end gun manufacturer lawsuits. With the governor’s 
permission, Wyoming specifically empowers its attorney general to 
defend the Second Amendment against gun manufacturer lawsuits 
that do not involve a defective firearm.83 As a result, gun 
manufacturers have an ally in the Wyoming attorney general.  
When the state has a gun immunity statute, plaintiffs must 
surmount both the state statute and the PLCAA to maintain their 
lawsuits.84 The states described above, which place additional 
obstacles in the path of plaintiffs, present an even more daunting 
challenge. However, in states lacking a gun immunity statute, 
plaintiffs need only hurdle the PLCAA to pursue lawsuits under 
general applicability statutes similar to CUTPA. As a result, Soto 
may have unleashed the extensive authority given attorneys 
general and private individuals pursuing consumer protection law 
claims in the manner described below. 
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B. Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices in Other States 
States initially passed UDAP laws, including CUTPA, with 
the intent to provide increased protection for deceptive and unfair 
trade practices above the remedies previously available through 
the Federal Trade Commission85 and provide state governments 
with extensive authority to ensure that businesses operate fairly 
and honestly.86 Encouraged by the result in Soto, plaintiffs may set 
their sights on lawsuits in states with favorable UDAP provisions 
and without gun immunity statutes. In selecting states with a 
favorable climate for future litigation of this kind, the following 
factors may contribute to the likelihood of emerging lawsuits. 
UDAP statutes, intentionally open-ended, allow for “the 
meanings of unfairness and deception . . . to be developed over 
time, so that UDAP law can adapt to future business practices.”87 
These open-ended statutes give substantial powers to state 
attorneys general in their interpretation and enforcement of 
UDAP laws.88 Recent exercises of these powers has led to growing 
concern that the states have strayed far from the intended 
purposes of the UDAP statutes.89 Should state attorneys general 
and private plaintiffs attempt to expand the meanings of “unfair” 
and “deceptive” as the court did in Soto, the firearms industry 
could face numerous lawsuits.  
Contrary to the awarding of attorney’s fees to defendants 
described above in Part IV.A, the awarding of plaintiffs’ attorney’s 
fees could promote increased firearms litigation. Generally, 
American courts do not award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties 
in the absence of a statutory or equitable exception.90 With respect 
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to UDAP laws, research from the National Consumer Law Center 
identifies only five states that do not permit the award of attorney’s 
fees in a successful UDAP claim: Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming.91 Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, 
and South Dakota have gun immunity statutes and Wyoming 
authorizes the attorney general’s representation of defendants in 
its gun immunity legislation. As these five states already represent 
inhospitable venues for litigation of this kind, the remaining states 
without gun immunity statutes encourage further litigation 
through the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 
In addition to the award of attorney’s fees, many states permit 
multiple damages allowing consumers two or three times their 
actual damages.92 Other states permit the recovery of punitive 
damages where the businesses acted intentionally.93 These states 
may encourage additional UDAP lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.  
When private plaintiffs receive the assistance of state 
attorneys general in firearms litigation, they gain a powerful ally 
and the firearms industry has a formidable adversary. State 
attorneys general, under a parens patriae theory, often seek 
recovery on behalf of an entire class of consumers94 and their 
authority may include powerful investigative tools such as civil 
investigative demands (CIDs).95 These CIDs allow attorneys 
general to demand information early in the investigative process.96 
When not preempted by other laws, such as gun immunity 
statutes, UDAP laws generally permit state attorneys general or 
other consumer protection officers to seek a wide range of remedies 
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including injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties.97 
According to the National Consumer Law Center, every state but 
Rhode Island allows the State to ask a court to impose a monetary 
penalty on a business that has engaged in an unfair or deceptive 
practice.98 Among the other forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia, the amounts of the penalties vary widely.99 For 
example, Maryland imposes a civil penalty of not more than 
$10,000 per initial violation100 and $25,000 for each subsequent 
violation.101 In contrast, Iowa can impose a penalty up to $40,000 
per violation.102  
Class actions allow plaintiffs to litigate a claim on behalf of 
both themselves—that is, the named plaintiffs—and class 
members who do not join as plaintiffs.103 Class actions facilitate 
the sharing of litigation costs among the named plaintiffs and 
other class members.104 This cost sharing creates claims where 
claims may not have arisen in the absence of the availability of a 
class action. With respect to UDAP, most states permit class 
actions.105 However, the UDAP statutes of eight states deny class 
actions: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Montana, South Carolina, and Tennessee.106 Since all eight states 
also have gun immunity statutes, class actions remain available in 
states that already have a favorable climate for successful 
lawsuits.107  
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V. Conclusion 
News reports depict our country as a nation gripped in an 
unending loop of gun violence, senseless school shootings, and 
inexplicable congressional silence. For example, one news outlet 
reports that for the one-year period ending in February of 2019, 
our nation experienced a school shooting, on average, every 11.8 
days.108 Admittedly, the explanations for this alarming statistic 
are complex. To begin to address these concerns, some call for 
increased restrictions on the right to purchase certain types of 
weapons while others see any proposed restrictions as an 
infringement of Second Amendment rights. When we seek to 
diminish gun ownership rights, “[w]e look first to Congress, then 
to the State Legislatures as the arbiters of such matters, subject to 
the oversight of the courts.”109 In the absence of congressional 
action, plaintiffs understandably seek other avenues to redress the 
harm caused by acts of gun violence. 
The tragic events that occurred in the morning hours at the 
Sandy Hook Elementary School unfolded as they did, in part, due 
to the sheer firepower of the weapon used by the perpetrator. Our 
society permits the lawful ownership of these powerful weapons, 
but wrestles with the assignment of fault when third parties use 
the weapons in a heinous criminal act. Such was the crux of the 
issue in Soto. Plaintiffs sought relief under CUTPA for the 
defendants’ alleged “unethical, oppressive, immoral, and 
unscrupulous” marketing of a lawful firearm.110 The primary 
stumbling block for plaintiffs, such as those in Soto, is the fact that 
in passing the PLCAA, Congress has seemingly prevented the 
ability of those in the firearms industry to be sued for harms that 
result from a third party’s wrongful use of a lawfully owned 
weapon.  
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In deciding that the PLCAA did not bar the plaintiffs’ CUTPA 
claims, the majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court stepped 
into policymaking that contradicted the congressional intent in 
passing the PLCAA. The Soto dissent correctly understood the 
proper role of the courts in these matters and the restraint needed 
to play that role. The dissent believed that Congress had made its 
intent very clear. Congress intended to “absolve defendants like 
these . . . from liability for criminal use of firearms by third parties 
except in the most limited and narrow circumstances . . . .”111 The 
dissenting opinion, authored by Chief Justice Robinson, went 
further and admonished the majority by stating that the court 
should act merely as “surrogates for another policy maker” and 
should not, “under the guise of statutory interpretation,” legislate 
a particular policy.112 Unfortunately, the majority played the role 
of legislator or regulator of the firearms industry, supplanting its 
own policy for the policy set out by Congress.  
The Connecticut Superior Court has not yet heard plaintiffs’ 
argument on the merits and we are waiting to see whether the U.S. 
Supreme Court will grant the defendant’s petition for certiorari 
filed with the Court on August 1, 2019.  Despite this uncertainty, 
Soto could prompt additional filings and further policymaking by 
the courts resulting from the favorable UDAP platform built for 
plaintiffs in several states. The open-ended UDAP laws, the 
powerful tools given state attorneys general, and the potential for 
attorney’s fees and enhanced damage awards increase the 
likelihood of further UDAP enforcement actions against gun 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in states without gun 
immunity statutes. Although the lack of solutions for gun violence 
may frustrate gun control activists and victims’ families, 
overturning bipartisan legislation113 and “suing guns out of 
existence” does not properly reflect our democratic principles.  
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